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This paper is concerned with two things: finding an objective and
easily quantifiable measure of government efficiency and testing possible
determinants of such quality. As measures of government efficiency we use
the ratios of infant mortality rate to health expenditures as a percentage
of GDP and the ratios of drop out and illiteracy rates to education expen-
ditures as a percentage of GDP. We assume that government efficiency
in providing health and education services depends on economic, political
and cultural factors.
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Nowadays a consensus has emerged that the efficiency of governments has an
impact on a country’s economic performance. High quality of public institutions
- and of governments more generally - is viewed as necessary to assure that
policies have a positive and lasting effect on income (Tanzi 2000). Assuming
the relative importance of good government, this paper addresses two related
issues of great interest: how can government efficiency be measured and why do
some countries have better government than others?
It is essential to start by defining what government efficiency is. In La Porta
et al (1999), good government stands for ”good-for-capitalistic development”.
Following this perspective the authors propose several measures of performance:
a good government protects property rights, intervenes little and taxes lightly;
it has a small dimension and a well- functioning bureaucracy free of corruption;
it is politically free and sustained by a democracy; it provides public goods of
high quality and, finally, it is efficient.
Some of these aspects generate controversy as they clearly have an ideological
content, as for instance low taxes and little intervention.
As to corruption and limitations to political freedom it can be argued that
more than proxies of good governing they determine the existence of good or
bad public institutions, which in turn may be able to provide better or worse
services. The same reasoning can be applied to bureaucratic systems: a well-
functioning bureaucracy can bee seen as a proxy or as a cause of good gov-
ernment. Following Brixiová (2001) we will consider bureaucracy as a possible
determinant of government quality: ”Bureaucratically organized systems tend
to be less efficient...”.
Contrary to other measures of government quality the provision of public
goods of superior quality is quite consensual. However assessing public good
quality can be as challenging as measuring government quality itself.
We seek to improve upon the existing measures of government efficiency
which can be of a qualitative nature or supported on subjective responses to
survey questions such as those carried out by the international country risk
guide.
In this paper we use the term good government to stand for a government
that provides services in essential sectors like health and education in an effi-
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cient way, i.e., where the relation between output indicators and the amount
of resources necessary to achieve them is high. Our measures compare govern-
ment output in a given sector with the amount of resources/money necessary to
provide that output1 . Health and education are two of the most important sec-
tors of government provision (St. Aubyn et al., 2004). According to the World
Development Indicators, average health expenditure (public and private) in the
nineties was around 5,5% of GDP in the United Sates and United Kingdom, al-
most 7% in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway or Switzerland and above 7%
in Germany, France and Sweden. The data on education is as striking. In USA
and UK more than 5% of GDP was spent in education; in Canada and Finland
this number rises to almost 7% and in Denmark, Norway or Sweden it goes
way beyond 7%. In addition, in these two sectors there are ample quantifiable
measures of output as well as information on sectorial public spending.2 So as
measures of government efficiency we use the ratios of infant mortality rate to
health expenditures as a percentage of GDP and the ratios of drop out and illit-
eracy rates to education expenditures as a percentage of GDP. We believe that
one of our contribution to the literature is providing new quantifiable measures
of government efficiency, different but related to the qualitative measures used
thus far.
As to the determinants of government efficiency, we believe there are struc-
tural factors that affect beliefs and behavior and that lend inertia to any institu-
tional change. At the same time institutions tend to be created or transformed
when the benefits of innovation are patently greater than the costs of inertia.
Whereas determinants such as major religion and the origins of the legal sys-
tem may mostly relate to very long-term determinants of government efficiency,
variables such as wealth and openness alter the trade-off between the benefits
and costs of institutional change and test the policy and structural variables
that affect government efficiency. We test the importance of the determinants
of government grouped as economic, political and cultural factors.
Concerning economic factors and following La Porta et al. (1999) we can
claim that institutions are created whenever the benefits of their existence are
1 Virtually any specific service can be provided and financed by the state and/or the private
sector so government efficiency needs to take into account the source of the financing.
2 In St. Aubyn et al., (2004), the authors use essentially the same measures but their
concern is to evaluate the performance of those sectors. As the authors point out ”We intend
to measure inefficiency and not so much explain it”. In this paper we try not so much to
explain inefficiencies in the health or educational systems per se, but inefficiencies in the
government provision of public services (using education and health as examples).
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greater than the costs os their creation. Wealth and development would make
this trade-off in favor of good governance, not only because development would
make good institutions affordable but also because it would make them more re-
liable. In Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) the authors suggest that different levels
of GDP per capita or educational attainment by the adult population (which
could serve as a proxy for the level of development) could be decisive in explain-
ing differences in government efficiency across countries.3 We will consider a set
of indicators that represent characteristics that differentiate the way societies
are shaped relating to their level of development. In particular, concentration
of urban population and the population age composition. The first can be re-
lated to the proximity to the decision makers. If the population, in general, is
located in or around cities, where the number (and sometimes the quality) of
hospitals and schools is bigger, will it interfere with the efficiency in which the
government is able to render its services? In Alejandro and Ernesto (2000) the
authors establish a link between the growth rate of urban concentration and
the ability of central authorities to provide adequate public services. Although
in Ades and Glaeser (1995) the authors defend a clear link between political
factors and urban concentration. The second tells us that the age structure of
the population is often seen as a sign of development. In Fougére and Merette
(1999) the authors establish and empirical relation between ageing population
and growth. There is also some literature that addresses the effects of the in-
verted demographic pyramid and public spending in education or health (see
Cattaneo and Wolter (2009) or Getzen (1991)).
In terms of political factors, the theory of political determinants of insti-
tutions states that those in power will shape policies and institutions to allow
them to remain in power and transfer resources toward themselves (La Porta
et al (1999)). Some groups and some societies allow rent seeking behavior in
a more generalized way than others. When this kind of behavior becomes per-
vasive and/or the groups in power care more about their own interest than
common interest, worse governance is the most likely outcome. In La Porta et
al. (1998), ethnic heterogeneity is used as a proxy for these political factors: if
there are several groups with different interests, the eagerness to stay in power
3 There are other variables that could indicate the level of development. In Evans et al
(2001) references are made to geographical location as an important factor in explaining the
poor performance of some governments.
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will be bigger. Governments become more interventionist and less efficient and
the quality of public goods falls4 . A member of a certain group will use its
power to generate benefits to the members of his group. In Lutz-Alexandre and
Muthoo (2003) the authors refer to the fact that the reluctance in changing
inefficient institutions into more efficient ones has also to do with the existence
of different groups with different bargaining power. In Alesina et al (2003) the
authors refer to links between inefficient policies and ethnic diversity. They
claim: ”Conflicts of preferences, racism, prejudices often lead to policies which
are suboptimal from the point of view of a society as a whole”.
Social polarization is also related to the existence of groups with different
and often opposed interests. Once again, when polarization is significant, we
tend to have worse governments. In Keefer and Knack (2002) the authors refer
that this factor alone can diminish the ability of government response to a crisis
as well as the stability of its decisions. Inequality in income distribution is one
of the main causes of social polarization.
The rent seeking behavior described above, will distort the way institutions
work making them more prone to corruption, excessive bureaucracy, etc. In
Mauro (2002) it is argued that corruption lowers investment (public or private)
distorting it (in a worse way than taxes Sheleifer and Vishny(1993)) in such a
way that will surely affect efficiency. In Aziz and Ul Haque (1998) the authors
consider that weak and inefficient governments are typically built around rent
seeking elites. In Gupta et al. (2000) the authors provide evidence that reducing
corruption increases efficiency or at least improves the quality of the outputs
measured by infant mortality and primary school drop out rates. InTanzi and
Davoodi (2000), the authors state that corruption may have negative impacts in
terms of public spending in education and health. If we assume that the amount
spent by a given government is the ”correct” one, if corrupt agents reduce it
than it will necessarily generate inefficiencies. Also concerning corruption and
efficiency, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show evidence that corruption may increase
public investment but will diminish its productivity.
In a related issue there is also some literature that deals with excessive bu-
reaucracy and inefficiencies of the public sector. Rauch(1995) makes reference
to the public provision of inputs that are complementary to the private sector.
4 This fact is also referred in Barro (2002) and in Mauro (1995).
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This provision tends to decrease in countries with a non-professional state bu-
reaucracy. Referring also to bureaucracy Brixiová and Bluir (2001) state that
systems with excessive bureaucracy tend to generate less efficient institutions.5
We will use some variables related with diversity and others with distor-
tions to the normal functioning of institutions as proxies of political theories of
institutional performance.
Finally as for the cultural factors, theories supporting cultural determinants
of institutions rely on the fact that societies have beliefs that induce collective
actions and make certain kind of behaviors more probable. When these beliefs
are strongly persistent they tend to be associated with culture (La Porta et al.
(1999)). An excessive intolerance or lack of self confidence can make it impossi-
ble for a society to have good institutions and consequently good governments.
In La Porta et. al (1997) the authors state that ”trust determines the perfor-
mance of a society’s institutions”. In Barro and McClay (2001) the authors
discuss the role of religion in a country’s institutional development. Religion
can be seen as a proxy of cultural characteristics since it strongly influences
individual and social actions. The authors establish a link between religion and
corruption showing some evidence that Protestant countries are less corrupt
than Catholic ones. In La Porta et al (1998) it is found that there is a negative
association between trust and the dominance of the main religion. It could be
argued that if different groups with different power hinder government quality,
then the existence of several religious groups would have a negative impact on
government quality. We believe that both arguments put forward concerning re-
ligious diversity may be true. However, and following the related literature, we
believe that the positive effect of religious diversity (which will lead to greater
trust and tolerance) may surpass the negative impact (presence of different so-
cial groups with different and colliding interests). Nevertheless the direction of
the effect of religious fractionalization on government efficiency remains to be
seen. We will also test if the dominance of one particular religion is relevant to
government performance.
Another possibility to account for the cultural diversity among countries is
their legal system. The legal system adopted by a country can be very closely
5 In Aziz and Ul Haque (1998) the authors sustain this idea when saying: ”Africa has
stagnated because its governments are weak and inefficient and often times made up of narrow
rent seeking elites”.
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related to the kind of habits and practices of its inhabitants (La Porta et al
(1997)). Following the literature we will consider five possible legal origins:
Socialist, Scandinavian, English Civil law, French Civil law and German legal
tradition.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we will present the data and
the indicators that assess government quality as well as the variables that are
representative of each group of determinants described above. In section 3 we
present and discuss the regression results exploring the data in order to find a
meaningful relation between efficiency and its determinants. Finally in section
4 we conclude.
2 Data
2.1 Definitions and Sources
The analysis presented in this paper uses a set of variables covering up to 208
countries. The definition and sources of all the variables are summarized in
Table 1, appendix A. For all variables, we used five year averages (1970 to 1974;
1975 to 1980, etc.) .
2.2 Dependent Variables
In this paper we try to build quantifiable and objective measures of government
performance. We selected Education, one of the fundamental sectors in almost
any country around the world and use two measures of output (Drop out rate
and illiteracy rate). We confirm our results testing also a health sector indicator
(infant mortality)6 . Our main focus is the efficiency in the use of government
resources, which means that more than being concerned with the output we are
interested in its relation with the amount of resources spent to deliver it. For
that purpose we do not use output per se but ratios of each of the output vari-
ables to public spending in the corresponding sector. We selected the following
measures of government performance:




public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP
drop−out rate
public education expenditures as a percentage of GDP
illiteracy rate
public education expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Notice that, for all measures, if we increase the numerator for the same
denominator we are in a worse situation which means that a higher value means
worse performance. However if we increase the denominator maintaining the
numerator (for example we increase health expenditures and infant mortality
rate remains the same) the ratio decreases and we are also worse of. Because we
cannot have different readings for the same variation of the measure we decided
to redefine our ratios in the following way:
100−infant mortality rate
public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP
100−drop−out rate
public education expenditures as a percentage of GDP
100−illiteracy rate
public education expenditures as a percentage of GDP
The three indicators for government efficiency divide a positive output mea-
sure by the expenditure incurred. Thus, an increase in the value of any of the
indicators can be interpreted as an increase in government efficiency. It means
that governments are able to deliver more for a lower cost.
Although there is no doubt that the input measures in the denominator are
measures of public sector inputs, it could be argued that the output measures in
the numerator depend at least as much on private investment. Thus these output
measures would be only partly the consequences of governmental activities. To
overcome this doubt we correlated each of our indicators with public and private
spending in both the health and the education sectors. We found, while having
positive correlations with both variables, the correlation with public spending
was at least five times higher than with private spending. This leads us to
conclude that those are much more dependent on public rather than private
investment.
We analyzed the relation between the subjective measures of efficiency used
in the literature such as political rights index, corruption index or bureaucracy
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index [La Porta et al (1997)]. We found that there were positive correlations
but far from 1. We believe that although we might be talking about similar
realities our variables are, in fact, capturing new information.7
2.3 Regressors
As independent economic variables we use per capita GDP, the percentage of
urban population, the age structure of the population, the sector structure of
employment, openness to trade and to foreign direct investment, and the share
of government expenditure in GDP .
As to political determinants, we used ethnic fractionalization index and gini
index to account for the number of different groups. To asses the degree of
distortion induced in the normal functioning of institutions we use tow indexes:
political freedom and law and order tradition. More likely law and order dis-
tortions associated to high corruption and excessive bureaucracy will lead to
less investment (public or private) and to the channeling of investment towards
the interests of certain groups, as in Sheleifer (1993). The relationship between
public and private sectors will also be damaged by the prevalence of distortions
in the political process, as shown in Rauch (1995). The absence of political or
civic liberties themselves can also damage government efficiency. As noted by
the authors of Tavares (2001), ”Democracy may also influence the ”quality of
governance”: rulers with discretionary power tend to set up distortionary poli-
cies that benefit a small set of insiders at the expense of the general population
(...). The exercise of power is potentially more arbitrary in autocratic regimes
that lack public scrutiny of policy makers”.
As to cultural determinants, we use religious fractionalization, the main
religion in the country , and the origins of a country´s legal system .
Table 2.1 to Table 2.6 present the main regression results. We start by ver-
ifying our intuition that income is positively related to government efficiency,
patent in the positive and significant coefficient for income per capita. A sec-
ond issue was the relation between government size and government efficiency:
7 It could be argued that a government could be extremely efficient but because previous
governments were very inefficient it would be difficult to increase our output indicators. One
way to overcome this issue is to consider variation of output measures. We believe that
considering averages we tackle this issue, if not completely at least to some considerable
extent. If a country has a very bad government followed by a very efficient one it will come
out as having a moderate quality government.
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is there a trade-off between the two, or, on the contrary, countries that can
”afford” larger governments also tend to have more efficient governments? We
found that general expenditures are positively and significantly associated with
government performance, independent of the relation between either to income
per capita. Though the literature is ambiguous on the relation between size and
government efficiency, our data using objective indicators of efficiency delivers
a strong result. We then add political and cultural indicators to determine
their relevance in explaining different government performance. We can also
verify that urban population is statistically relevant and positively associated
with government efficiency. This means that rather than being a proxy for the
level of underdevelopment, urban concentration makes it easier to provide good
quality services. The age structure of the population does not have a consistent
effect on government efficiency. As to the employment structure, an interesting
result emerges: the more agricultural oriented a society is, the less efficient its
government will be, but the percentage of employment in services is also detri-
mental to government efficiency. While gross foreign direct investment has no
relevance in explaining government efficiency, openness to trade does matter and
has a positive effect on all indices considered. In the literature there is evidence
of a linkage between this indicators and efficiency using the subjective indica-
tors of government performance. The authors in Larain (2007) conclude that
both foreign direct investment and openness have a positive effect on corruption
(meaning less corruption)
According to the literature, we expected that larger differences between
groups within a society — be it income inequality or ethnic differences - leads
to social polarization and government inefficiency. While the introduction of
the Gini income inequality and the ethnic fractionalization indices do not alter
results on income per capita and government size, the results for the former
are not consistent, though ethnic fractionalization has a statistically significant
negative impact on infant mortality . In the second set of political variables
we observe that increases in the law and order index and in political rights are
associated with increases in government performance. However, the later index
is only statistically relevant in the first regression.
Cultural traditions that favor trust and confidence, that protect the
individual against the state and that limit the power of politicians should im-
prove government efficiency. According to La Porta (1997), there is a negative
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association between trust and the dominance of a strong religion. Hence, reli-
gious fractionalization may lead to higher government efficiency if societies are
able to overcome differences. A related issue has to do with the influence of
the country’s main religious confession in government efficiency. Following La
Porta (1998) and Barro (2000), we expect that Protestant countries have more
efficient governments than Catholic or Muslim ones. Our results allow us to
conclude that religious fractionalization has, in fact, a positive effect on gov-
ernment efficiency, the case being stronger in the education sector. Religious
dummies for the main religious denomination in the country do not have rel-
evance in determining government performance, and the same is true for the
country’s legal system.
Table 2.1 - Regression Results for irpse
irpse (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
const. -0.559 52.5 39.39 54.63 58.35 62.14
GDPpc 11.486∗∗∗ 4.446∗ 5.298∗ 4.333∗ 4.031∗ 2.813∗





R2 11.1 28.2 42.2 28.6 30.3 36.3
n. obs 560 418 217 413 405 262
Table 2.2 - Regression Results for irpse
irpse (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
const. 49.8 59.6 53.6 85.9 53.3
GDPpc 4.592∗ 2.783∗ 4.028∗ 1.602∗∗ 4.494∗









R2 29.1 29.6 28.9 40.2 36.4
n. obs. 415 418 418 221 360
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Table 2.3 - Regression Results for dorpse
dorpse (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
const. 63.49 62.34 46.74 60.59 64.87 59.55
GDPpc 3.619∗ 3.016∗ 3.979∗ 3.146∗ 2.785∗ 3.079∗





R2 22.1 28.6 33.5 28.7 28.4 33.7
n. obs. 459 380 220 380 374 215
Table 2.4 - Regression Results for dorpse
dorpse (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
const. 61.04 60.233 66.35 77.88 59.97
GDPpc 0.343∗ 3.549∗ 3.329∗ 3.138∗ 3.109∗









R2 28.9 28.8 28.9 55.9 30.3
n. obs. 380 380 375 191 328
Table 2.5 - Regression Results for mrihepu
mrihepu (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
const. -41.66 -31.58 44.88 -4.773 -16.52 -28.63
GDPpc 15.232∗ 12.463∗ 5.951∗ 10.841∗ 11.201∗ 11.855∗





R2 42.5 47.0 43.8 49.8 47.3 48.3
n. obs. 328 231 149 227 222 190
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Table 2.2 - Regression Results for mrihepu
mrihepu (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
const. -32.09 -21.42 81.56 89.82 -44.13
GDPpc 12.525∗ 9.207∗ 8.416∗ 6.212∗ 13.265∗









R2 47.7 48.4 52.3 55.9 29.6
no obs. 229 231 223 194 215
∗significantat1%; ∗ ∗ significantat5%; ∗ ∗ ∗significantat10%
2.3.1 Endogeneity Issues
The main question of this paper is weather a country’s economic, political or
cultural conditions explain the differences in government performance. we are
aware that this is a difficult task because most of the variables considered may,
in turn, be influenced by government quality (this being particularly true in the
case of economic factors). there is some literature on the tight link between
institutions and development or wealth and most of them address endogeneity
issues. In particular the seminal work of Acemoglu et al. (2001), try to establish
that income today is determined by a proxy for institutional quality and other
non economic variables. The authors address the problem of the possible endo-
geneity of institutional quality: good institutions can foster wealth but richer
countries can afford institutions of an higher quality. The problem is apparently
solved by using settler mortality as an instrumental variable. There were some
criticism of the work of Acemouglu et al. (2001) namely a paper by Albouy
(2004). This issue is complex and probably the biggest weakness of research
concerning institutional quality and GDP (or other measures of richness).
To trust in our results we wanted to confirm if we had major endogeneity
issues with our variables.
We used the Hausman test for endogeneity that can briefly be explained as
follows :
Suppose that we are running the regression:
y1i = β1 + β2X2i + ...+ βkXki + δy2i + µi (1)
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We suspect that y2 may be endogenous (we assume that all Xi are exoge-
nous). To perform the test we first regress y2 against all the variables X in the
previous model and a set of instrumental variables Z.
y2i = β1 + β2X2i + ...+ βkXki + α1Z1i + ...+ αjZji + υi (2)
if y2 is exogenous, than E(µi, υi) = 0. This would mean that E(y1i, υi) = 0.
We can run the regression:
y1i = β1 + β2X2i + ...+ βkXki + δy2i + ρυi + εi (3)
An test the hypothesis : H0 : ρ = 0. Under H0 y2 is exogenous.
So, the first thing we have to do is to find instrumental variables for all the
variables we want to test.
Previously we concluded that loggdppc was one of the main determinants of
government efficiency variability around the world. Following the literature we
were particularly concerned with the possible endogeneity of this variable. We
choose latitude as an instrumental for loggdppc8 and run the Hausman test9 .
In table 3 v1 are the estimation residuals of 1 .
Table 3 irpse dorpse mrihepu
v1 (coefficient) 1.859 3.118 26.158
t-stat 0.31 0.50 3.56
P > |t| 0.756 0.618 0.000
We can see from the results that loggdppc seems to be exogenous to the
model (at least when we are talking about education).
Because of the nature of the variable we were also interested in testing en-
dogeneity of general expenditures. We used as instruments for government
expenditures both the electoral rule (Majorit) and the political regime (Pres).
The link between electoral institutions and the size and composition of public
expenditures can be seen in (Miles-Ferretti et al., 2000). In Person (2001) the
authors conclude that political institutions (such as electoral rules and political
regimes) do shape economic policy and consequently are linked to the size of
8 In (Hall et al., 1999) the authors conclude that there is a strong link between output per
worker and social infrastructure using latitude as an instrument.
9 To run the Hausman test we chose the variables that were more consistently significant
through out the previous analysis.
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public expenditures10 . In table 4 u1 are the estimation residuals of 1 . The con-
clusion are not as reassuring as the one we draw for loggpdpc, although at 5%
we can say that the variable is exogenous in terms of the education regressions.
Table 4 irpse dorpse mrihepu
u1 (coefficient) 0.322 0.218 0.827
t-stat 1.98 0.1.57 2.58
P > |t| 0.057 0.12 0.011
10 For more on the relation between political institutions and public spending see also Persson
et al. (2005) and Persson et al. (2003)
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3 Conclusion
We examine the relationship between indicators of government efficiency in the
health and education sector and several of its aggregate determinants. We
confirm our initial intuition that income is positively related to government effi-
ciency made clear by the positive and significant coefficient of income per capita
in all regressions. We also verify that general expenditures are positively and
significantly related with government performance. We can then conclude that
the most consistent and robust determinants of government efficiency are the
level of income per capita, with richer countries displaying higher government
efficiency, and government size, with increases in the amount spent by general
government as share of GDP positively related to efficiency.
Urban population is statistically relevant and positively associated with gov-
ernment efficiency. This means that a higher share of the population in urban
areas makes it easier to provide good public services.
The age structure of the population does not have a consistent effect on
government efficiency. On the other hand, agricultural oriented societies lead
to less efficient governments. The data also indicates that high percentages of
employment in services does not foster government quality.
In terms of openness we conclude that while foreign direct investment has
no relevance in explaining government efficiency, openness to trade does matter
and is good for efficiency.
We also find some evidence that the existence of different groups in society
has some bearing in government performance, while political rights and law and
order affect government performance in a positive manner.
As to cultural factors, only religious fractionalization seems to matter, with
the main religious denomination irrelevant for government efficiency.
We can conclude that there is a wide range of factors contributing to dif-
ferences in government efficiency across the world. We have economic, political
and cultural variables all relevant to government efficiency. However the data
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Ethn frac. (EF) Index ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al (1999)
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Health expenditures public Public Health expenditures, % gdp WDI 2000
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Income per capita (GDPpc) gdp constant prices 1995 US$, per capita WDI 2000
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Political rights index (PRI) Political rights index Freedom House 2003
Religious frac. (RF) Religious fractionalization index La Porta et al (1999)
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% Urban Pop (UP) Urban population, % total population. WDI 2000
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